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 Introduction 
 Foreseeability of harm is a necessary requirement to establish a breach of duty in negligence, 
but it is not a suffi cient requirement. It is still necessary to consider what the defendant 
did (or should have done) in response to the risk he could reasonably foresee. 1 This is an 
exercise in balancing competing elements. 2 Therefore, one important question will be, 
what factors go into that side of the balance when considering what the defendant ought 
to have done in response to the foreseeable risk ? How is a court to assess what a reasonable 
defendant would have done ? One factor which has appeared with increasing frequency 
in judicial pronouncements is the issue of social utility. To what extent, in deciding what a 
defendant ought to do in response to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury, is it relevant 
that the defendant was engaged in a socially useful activity ? 
 That social utility is relevant seems to be almost universally agreed upon. 3 Mullender 
describes this as the  ‘ mainstream view ’ . 4 Indeed, it is a concept which nowadays fi nds 
statutory support in section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 and in section 2 of the Social 
Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015. 5 The view that social utility is a relevant 
factor may be  almost universal, but it is certainly not totally universal. Beever has argued 
that social utility, in fact, plays no part in negligence decisions. 6 This article will seek 
to analyse the role of social utility in the law of negligence. While it will conclude that 
Beever ’ s position is overly robust, it is true that many of the decisions in which social utility 
is discussed (or, indeed, merely mentioned) do not rely on the concept for their outcome. 
In addition, there are signifi cant problems in giving the concept of social utility a measure 
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of coherent content that might afford it much practical value in real cases. Further, and in 
(partial) agreement with Beever, this article will argue that social utility should not be a 
factor considered in breach of duty decisions in negligence claims 
 What is social utility ? 
 One of the many problems with the concept of social utility is the way in which the term is 
used with limited (if any) attention to what it actually means. The range of activities which 
could (plausibly) be considered to possess social utility is extensive and wide ranging. 7 In 
addition, there is also scope for disagreements as to how much social utility a particular 
activity carries in a particular situation. These factors can make cases diffi cult to analyse. 
Talking of social utility as a single concept may, therefore, neglect some of the nuance. 
With this in mind I have attempted to classify social utility into four different types. It 
is not claimed that these categories are watertight, nor that other methodologies could 
not be used instead. Nor, indeed, is it claimed that this classifi cation captures all possible 
examples of social utility. It is submitted, however, that it provides a structure within which 
to analyse the cases. 
 These four types are: 
 1.  Those situations where the claimant herself is a direct recipient of that social utility. 
Into this category could be put what we might call the participating claimants. This 
category would, for example, include a claimant injured while taking part in a  ‘ fun 
day ’ activity such as a game as part of some kind of organised event. 8 
 2.  Those situations where the injured claimant is a mere bystander to the social utility 
involved in the activity. Echoing a case that will need to be discussed in due course, 
this category would include a claimant injured by a cricket ball hit out of a cricket 
ground by a player. 9 
 3.  Those situations where the claimant is not  directly benefi ting from the activity because 
they are not participating but could be said to be  indirectly benefi ting because society 
as a whole benefi ts from the activity. Into this category might fall the emergency 
services cases, for example another road user injured by an ambulance or fi re appliance 
responding to an emergency call. 10 
 4.  Those situations where the claimant is participating as an employee of an employer 
undertaking a socially useful activity. Clearly, such a claimant could be argued to 
be receiving a direct benefi t from the activity through the payment of wages (and, 
in some situations at least, higher wages than she might have received had she 
been engaged in other types of employment 11 ) but such situations are potentially 
made more complicated by the additional layer of obligations that stem from the 
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employment relationship. 12 Into this category might fall the fi re fi ghter injured while 
being carried in a fi re appliance responding to an emergency call. 13 
 Duty or breach ? 
 Before we begin to look at some of the cases within these categories there is one further 
preliminary point worthy of consideration. To what extent is this question about duty 
and to what extent is it about breach of duty ? At least in theory it is about both. Issues of 
social utility are capable of arising at either duty or breach stage. When they arise at duty 
stage they tend to do so under the third limb of the  Caparo test, 14 which asks whether 
the imposition of a duty is fair, just and reasonable. 15 Even though social utility could 
be a factor in determining whether a duty of care exists in the fi rst place, logically and 
analytically that is a different process from the balancing exercise which exists in breach 
cases. It may, however, be a mistake to see duty and breach as if they were always entirely 
separate questions. Deciding that a duty exists is not, by itself, suffi cient to determine the 
liability question. The scope or content of the duty still needs to be determined, that is to 
say: is there a duty to guard the claimant against the specifi c misfortune which befalls him. 
So, a case like  Tomlinson (to which we will return) is highly relevant in this context, but can 
be seen as a decision on duty rather than breach in that it is about the scope of the duty 
owed by the defendant to the claimant. 16 Further, looking at breach of duty issues can be 
problematic because breach decisions are always highly fact sensitive as judges are seeking 
to fi t case-specifi c facts into a broad adjudicative approach. Mullender refers to judges 
responding to  ‘ circumstantial pressure ’ . 17 This does not, however, mean that nothing useful 
can be said about that general approach. 
 It might be easiest to say that these issues are  primarily breach issues but that, in 
determining the relevance of social utility to liability, fully separating breach from duty 
may not be a productive exercise. 
 Type 1 cases 
 These are, as will be recalled, cases where the claimant is a direct participant in the activity 
said to carry with it social utility. These are cases where there has been much mention of 
social utility by judges, certainly in more recent times. Despite that, we might conclude 
that the outcomes in these cases in fact seem to depend on the interaction of two related 
conclusions: 
 1.  That the level of foreseeable risk of serious injury was low, meaning that there was 
limited (if any) obligation on the defendant to protect the claimant from the injury 
suffered; 18 
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 2.  That the injury was caused entirely by conduct of the claimant in choosing to take an 
obvious risk. 19 This might have led to a conclusion that the defendant escaped liability 
because of the defence of  volenti non fi t injuria. But this is not the analytical route 
generally used in these cases. Logically, the issue of a defence cannot arise unless and 
until the defendant has fi rst been found to be in breach of duty. 20 These defendants 
have not been found to be in breach of duty. Rather the fact that the claimant chose 
to take an obvious risk is used at the stage of the defendant ’ s foreseeability question. 
Essentially, it was not reasonably foreseeable to a defendant that a claimant would do 
something as daft as these claimants did, when doing so exposed them to an obvious 
risk of injury. 
 It seems appropriate to start with  Tomlinson because much of the more recent 
name-checking of social utility by judges seems to have its origins in part of the speech 
of Lord Hoffmann in this case. 21 The claimant went to a country park occupied by the 
defendant. The park contained a lake which had formed in a disused quarry. Despite the 
presence of  ‘ no swimming ’ signs the claimant, an adult, dived from a standing position 
into the shallow water at the edge of the lake. He hit his head on the bottom and 
suffered catastrophic injuries. Prior to the accident the defendants, following advice 
from their health and safety advisers, had decided to change the landscape around the 
shore in order to make it more diffi cult for people to access the lake. This was despite 
the fact that the lakeside was used extensively (and safely) by very many visitors to 
picnic, play on the water ’ s edge and paddle in the shallows. Although the council had 
determined to do that work it had not been carried out at the time of the accident. The 
claimant sued the council as occupier. The House of Lords dismissed the claim because 
of what can be said to be a reason specifi c to the Occupiers Liability Acts. 22 As such the 
issue of social utility was not relevant to the decision and anything said about it was, 
strictly,  obiter. Such  obiter statements of the House of Lords, however, clearly carry some 
weight. 23 
 Lord Hoffmann stated that what amounted to reasonable care depended not only on 
 ‘ the likelihood that someone may be injured and the seriousness of the injury which may 
occur, but also the social value of the activity which gives rise to the risk and the cost of 
preventative measures ’ . 24 Lord Hoffmann went on to express concern that the  ‘ harmless 
recreation of responsible parents and children ’ may be hindered were a duty imposed on 
the council to prevent the claimant doing what he did. 25 This, he said,  ‘ would damage the 
quality of many people ’ s lives ’ . 26 
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 It might be said here that Lord Hoffmann was confl ating the social utility of 
preserving access to generally safe leisure facilities with another issue, that of the autonomy 
of individuals like the claimant to take risks if they wish to do so. Arguably Lord Hoffmann 
made more of the autonomy point than he did of the more general social utility point. 27 It 
is, of course, perfectly possible to argue that there is a social utility is preserving individual 
autonomy to do daft things. Indeed, it can be said that this is related to the provision 
of generally safe leisure facilities, because preserving such facilities in a generally safe 
condition may equally preserve the potential jeopardy to those who choose to use them 
in a way that exposes them to risk. As such, any social utility in autonomy and any social 
utility in not restricting access may be seen as complimentary. 
 So, a couple of things can be said about  Tomlinson . Firstly, it is not part of the  ratio of 
the case that courts must consider social utility. Secondly, it is clear that Lord Hoffmann 28 
considered social utility to be of importance in the breach of duty balancing exercise. 
 Despite that, it could be said that the argument advanced by Lord Hoffmann in 
 Tomlinson has caught on, with it being mentioned by a number of judges in subsequent 
cases. 29 What remains diffi cult to identify are cases in which the social utility of the 
defendant ’ s conduct appears to make any difference to the ultimate outcome. What may 
be most instructive, are cases in which the social utility of the activity was considered to be 
high, but liability was imposed despite this. Such cases may help indicate what role social 
utility plays in decision making. 
 One case that provides an example here is  Uren v Corporate Leisure . 30 This case has an 
unusual procedural history. The claimant ’ s claim was initially dismissed at fi rst instance, 31 
but that decision was overturned on appeal with the Court of Appeal ordering a retrial. 32 
The claimant was successful at that retrial. 33 
 The case concerned an RAF serviceman who suffered catastrophic injuries while 
participating in a game at what was described as a  ‘ health and fun day ’ organised at his 
RAF base. The particular game was a relay race which involved the retrieval of plastic 
objects from a shallow, water-fi lled infl atable pool. The claimant entered the pool headfi rst 
and, in doing so, struck his head on the base of the pool, resulting in the relevant injuries. 
At the fi rst trial Field J found for the defendants. In overturning that decision the Court of 
Appeal found the judge ’ s reasoning (that the level of foreseeable risk was very low) open 
to doubt. In considering the role of social utility, Smith LJ said: 
 ‘ I wish to make it plain that, if I had been satisfi ed that the judge ’ s conclusion 
as to the low level of risk entailed, I would not have interfered with the way in 
which he balanced that risk against the social benefi ts of the activity. I confess 
that I personally would not have assessed the social value of this game in quite 
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such glowing terms as did the judge but I accept that he did not make any error 
of approach. ’ 34 
 While it is clear, therefore, that there was a disagreement as to amount of social utility the 
activity had, Smith LJ was entirely on board with the idea that that was a concept which 
a judge could (and, arguably, must 35 ) take into account when conducting the breach of 
duty balancing exercise. The problem arose not in respect of the assessment of social utility 
but in respect of the level of foreseeable risk against which that was being balanced. Of 
the other two judges, Pitchford LJ merely expressed agreement. 36 Aikens LJ made no 
specifi c mention of social utility, but his judgment is short and he did express agreement 
with Smith LJ as to both outcome and reasoning. 37 There was, therefore, no dissent in the 
Court of Appeal that the social utility of the activity was a relevant consideration in the 
assessment of breach of duty. 
 At the retrial Foskett J concluded, on the evidence, that the risk of head fi rst entry 
should have been foreseen (particularly in the context of a race involving a competitive 
element) and, once that was foreseen  ‘ alarm bells should have rung ’ as to possibility of this 
going wrong and injury occurring. 38  While it was ‘ impossible to put a statistical likelihood ’ 39 
on this, the risk could not be classifi ed as minimal or very small. In such circumstances 
the risk could not be ignored  ‘ unless it could be said that there was something in the 
particular game that made it worth taking the risk ’ . 40 Having reached that conclusion 
Foskett J moved on to consider the social utility of the activity. He discussed this in very 
positive terms 41 as being enjoyable, light-hearted and a positive bonding experience for 
the participants. Foskett J did, however, make a further point, which was that there is also a 
social utility in avoiding injury. 42 This was for its own sake (such injuries are life changing 
for the victim) but also because participation in such events was likely to be threatened if 
they were not perceived to be reasonably safe. This illustrates an important point. While 
social utility is often seen as a factor that points away from the imposition of liability, there 
are elements of social utility that would promote the taking of care. As with much in 
negligence law the issue is one of balance. 
 Despite the high level of social utility the judge considered to attach to the activity 
he concluded that the defendants were in breach of duty because, balancing the degree of 
foreseeable risk with the social utility of the activity they should have banned head fi rst 
entry, making it clear that any participant who ignored the ban would be disqualifi ed in 
order to encourage compliance. 43 
 Foskett J went on to disavow the argument often advanced by defendants in these 
sorts of cases, that a fi nding of liability would lead to such socially valuable activities 
being discontinued. The judge did not consider his decision to be a threat to such games 
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because the game could have proceeded without liability had head fi rst entry (the most 
risky element) been banned and playing the game in that manner would not have reduced 
its social utility at all. 44 Indeed, harking back to an earlier comment of the judge, playing 
the game in that manner would have enhanced its social utility because it would have 
provided all the same benefi ts but would have minimised the risk of injury. It would not, of 
course, have eliminated the risk of injury. Some risk will always exist in such game playing. 
But eliminating all risk of injury is not what negligence law requires of defendants and, 
ultimately, how much risk is too much is a matter for judges. 
 Type 2 cases 
 These are cases where, in contrast to type 1 cases, the claimant is not a participant in the 
activity but is a mere bystander to it. The case very often cited in relation to the relevance 
of social utility in these circumstances is  Bolton v Stone. 45 
 The facts of this case are probably well known but, briefl y, involved a cricket match 
being played at a cricket ground. A batsman hit a ball out of the ground whereupon 
it struck the claimant who was innocently standing in the adjacent, relatively lightly 
frequented street causing her injury. The evidence was that hitting a ball out of the ground 
was something that had happened previously but that it was infrequent. 46 The House of 
Lords found in favour of the defendant. Although often cited as an example of the role 
of social utility in such cases that interpretation is hard to support on the face of the 
judgment. 47 None of the speeches in the House of Lords make any reference to social 
utility. The reasoning for the outcome seems, rather, to be that the risk of injury was so 
small that the defendants were justifi ed in taking no action in respect of it. The frequency 
with which  Bolton v Stone comes up in relation to social utility seems to stem from its 
 ‘ reinvention ’ some years later by the Privy Council in  Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The 
Miller Steamship Co ( ‘ the Wagon Mound No 2 ’ ). 48 This is not, in itself, a social utility case 
in the traditional sense. It concerned the careless discharge of a large quantity of oil onto 
the water in Sydney Harbour; the oil was subsequently ignited, causing damage to the 
claimant ’ s vessels. As such the activity was a commercial one. 49 
 The relevance of that latter case lies in certain comments of Lord Reid (who had, 
himself, been one of the judges in  Bolton v Stone ). The one sense in which it had been 
possible to identify a similarity between the two cases was that in both the likelihood of 
harm was small (in  Wagon Mound No 2 because the likelihood of the particular type of oil 
igniting when dispersed on water was not high). In contrast to  Bolton v Stone , however, the 
claimant vessel owners were successful. Lord Reid reaffi rmed that the basis of the decision 
in  Bolton v Stone was  ‘ that the risk was so small that in the circumstances a reasonable 
man would have been justifi ed in disregarding it and taking no steps to eliminate it ’ . 50 
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 ‘ the diffi culty of eliminating it. If the activity which caused the injury to Miss Stone had 
been an unlawful activity, there can be little doubt but that [the case] would have been 
decided differently ’ . 52 What are we to make of these comments of Lord Reid ? Clearly the 
fi rst point of note is that the words  ‘ social utility ’ do not appear. But what seems to be clear 
is that Lord Reid is envisaging a position whereby a relatively low level of foreseeable 
risk can be legitimately ignored in some situations but not in others. This would imply, 
contrary to Beever ’ s view, that there was something more going on here than merely the 
fact that the risk of injury was too small to warrant any remedial action. 53 Whether or 
not the facts of  Bolton v Stone would yield the same outcome nowadays may, of course, 
be open to question. The idea that the playing of cricket is an activity that can justify 
ignoring a risk of the level engaged in this case may be an idea that has waned somewhat 
over time. 
 Type 3 cases 
 These cover a wide range of cases where the activity is considered to be for the benefi t of 
the community as a whole, the injured claimant is a recipient of that benefi t by virtue of 
being a member of that community but the activity is not being performed for (or by) the 
claimant directly. This category is potentially quite extensive but one major sub-class can 
be described as  ‘ emergency services ’ cases. 
 This type includes what is probably the case most cited as authority for the 
proposition that social utility is a relevant factor in determining breach issues,  Watt v 
Hertfordshire County Council. 54 The claimant was a fi re fi ghter injured while on route to an 
emergency. A woman had become trapped beneath a vehicle. The fi re brigade responded 
by sending a heavy jack transported (unsecured) on the back of a lorry with the claimant 
and two colleagues also in the back of the lorry with it. As the lorry rushed to the scene of 
the accident (which was, actually, only a couple of hundred yards from the fi re station) the 
jack moved striking the claimant and injuring his ankle. No vehicle more suited to the safe 
transportation of the jack was available at that fi re station at that time. The claimant ’ s claim 
against the fi re service (his employer) was lost. The judgments in the Court of Appeal are 
short, and that of Denning LJ (most often cited as authority for the proposition that social 
utility is a relevant factor) is particularly so. What he said in that short judgment, however, 
was this  ‘ you must balance the risk against the end to be achieved. If this accident had 
occurred in a commercial enterprise without any emergency there could be no doubt that 
the [claimant] would succeed ’ . 55 Morris LJ made no similar reference to the social utility 
( ‘ the end to be achieved  … ’ ) but seemed to base his judgment on the fact that this was an 
emergency and so there was nothing else the defendants could do. 56 Singleton LJ arguably 
gave a slightly different reasoning. For him the issue seemed to be that risks are inherent 
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in the nature of life as a fi refi ghter and the risk to which this claimant was exposed did 
not go beyond the ordinary risk in that role. 57 Having said that Singleton LJ did quote 
approvingly the comment of Asquith LJ in  Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co , who said 
that in determining negligence  ‘ a relevant circumstance to take into account may be the 
importance of the end to be served by behaving in this way or in that ’ . 58  Daborn itself is a 
factually quite unusual case. In the fi rst instance it arose during wartime and so, arguably, 
it may be more diffi cult to extrapolate to peacetime conditions. Secondly, neither of the 
other two judges expressly endorsed Asquith LJ ’ s comment but placed their judgments on 
the basis that the claimant had simply done nothing wrong and could not, therefore, be 
founded to have acted negligently. Thirdly, the use made of social utility in the case was 
to help an injured claimant to a successful claim because the question being considered 
was whether or not she had been contributorily negligent. 59 Fourthly, in so far as 
Asquith LJ was stating a proposition of law, he cited no authority for it. 
 On the face of it, therefore,  Watt does appear to provide reasonably strong support 
for the relevance of social utility in the breach of duty balancing exercise, at least in this 
category of case. If it is undermined in any way it is, perhaps (as has been pointed out 
elsewhere 60 ) because on its own facts it is not clear that it is correctly decided. As the 
accident was only a couple of hundred yards from the fi re station it is not clear why 
the fi refi ghters, like Mr Watt, needed to be transported in the lorry with the jack rather 
than walking to the scene, nor, indeed, why the lorry driver could not have proceeded 
suffi ciently slowly to prevent the movement of the jack without signifi cantly delaying 
the arrival of help to the awaiting victim. Notwithstanding those doubts, on the premise 
on which it proceeded, none of the judges expressed any dissent as to the relevance to 
liability of the  ‘ end to be achieved ’ . Nor has this reasoning received any signifi cant judicial 
challenge, with  Watt being cited in more or less approving terms a number of times 
subsequently. 61 
 One such case, also arising in the context of the work of the emergency services, 
is  King v Sussex Ambulance Trust. 62 The claimant was an ambulance man called to take a 
patient from home to hospital. The call was rated as urgent, but not an emergency. The 
patient needed to be brought downstairs and the only equipment available to do so was a 
carry chair. While the claimant and his colleague were carrying the patient downstairs the 
colleague momentarily loosened his grip causing all the weight of the patient and chair 
to fall on the claimant, who suffered injury. No negligence appears to have been alleged 
against the fellow employee for loosening his grip. Instead the claim was brought against 
the ambulance service based upon the system of work. One element of the claim was that 
the fi re brigade should have been called. The evidence was that this was an option available 
to ambulance crews but would generally be considered only as a last resort. The patient 
involved in this transfer was estimated to weigh about 12 stones and so was not excessively 
heavy in terms of patients generally encountered. 63 
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 Unlike some of the other cases looked at, this one could not be disposed of on 
the basis that the risk of injury was very small. As Hale LJ made clear, a lift of 12 stones 
between two people, particularly downstairs, gave rise to a clearly foreseeable risk of 
injury. 64 There was, therefore, an obligation on the part of the ambulance service to do 
what was reasonable in the circumstances to reduce that risk. In contrast to Singleton LJ 
in  Watt , Hale LJ was not attracted to the idea that emergency service workers can 
legitimately be exposed to greater risks than others merely because  ‘ occupations in the 
public service are inherently dangerous ’ . 65 As she put it,  ‘ public servants accept the risks 
which are inherent in their work, but not the risks which the exercise of reasonable 
care  … could avoid ’ . 66 Hale LJ went on to ask,  ‘ what  … is reasonable in this context ? ’ 67 
In assessing the relevant  ‘ context ’ Hale LJ cited, without demur, Denning LJ from  Watt 
and went on to consider social utility issues as being a relevant part of that context. She 
noted that the ambulance service owed a duty to the public as well as to their employees 
and that they did not, unlike a commercial service, have the option of refusing the call. 68 
She concluded that  ‘ what is reasonable may have to be judged in the light of the service ’ s 
duties to the public and the resources available to it to perform those duties, ’ 69 going on 
to note that the activity was  ‘ of considerable social utility ’ . 70 She dismissed the claim on 
the basis that the employers had done all that they reasonably could have done in that 
context. Echoing the comments of Denning LJ in  Watt , Hale LJ noted that had this been 
a fi rm of furniture removers who had been asked to move heavy furniture downstairs, 
then unless they could do the job without unacceptable risk then their obligation would 
have been to decline the job and, if they had not done that, they would have been liable 
to an employee injured by the materialisation of that risk. 71 
 King , therefore, seems to be an important case because it accepts that the claim 
cannot have been decided on the basis that the risk of injury was minimal and, in assessing 
what the employer could reasonably have done makes specifi c reference to the social 
utility of the activity, assesses breach of duty in that context and, indeed, draws a distinction 
between this activity and a similar one taking place in a commercial (ie non-social utility) 
context where the outcome would likely be different. 
 Type 4 cases 
 It has been said earlier that the four categories of utility cases are not watertight but overlap. 
This is most clearly so with type 4 cases: situations where the claimant is participating as 
an employee of an employer undertaking a socially useful activity. These are not likely to 
arise in isolation but, rather, where the situation would fall into one or other of the earlier 
types, most often, perhaps, type 3 cases. Indeed, it can be seen that both  Watt and  King are 
themselves examples of cases that span types 3 and 4. It might, therefore, be asked whether 
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it is useful to give separate consideration to employee cases at all. I would submit that it 
is because the nature of the employment relationship gives rise to a level of duty which 
would not arise outside the employment context. For example, employers do, often, bear 
liability for omissions in circumstances where a non-employer would not. 72 In addition, 
there is a greater level of statutory intervention in the health and safety of employees than 
exists more generally. 73 The question which needs to be asked is whether there are any 
instances where the special nature of the employment relationship limits the degree to 
which the social utility of the employer ’ s operations are relevant to injury claims brought 
against it by its employees, who bear the task of executing those socially useful activities. 
The answer would seem to be  ‘ no ’ ; there seem to be no such indications. In  King itself 
there is no suggestion in the words of Hale LJ that the nature of the balancing exercise 
differs fundamentally because the claimant is an employee as opposed to a member of the 
public injured by the activity. If there is a difference it lies in the nature of the employment, 
not in the fact of the employment. 
 Humphrey v Aegis Defence Services Ltd 74 is one of a number of cases where injuries 
occurred to civilian employees engaged in the post-war reconstruction in Iraq. 75 While 
once again this was a case whose outcome (the dismissal of the claim) can be explained by 
a fi nding that the level of foreseeable risk was insuffi ciently high, Moore-Bick LJ echoed 
much of what had gone before in noting the potential signifi cance of the social utility of 
the activity in determining breach of duty questions. 76 
 The reasons why some type 4 cases perhaps  ought to be treated differently was raised 
in a speculative fashion in  King by Buxton LJ. In essence he raised this question  – if the 
activity being provided by Mr King ’ s employers (and by other similar services) are of such 
high public utility  ‘ why should  … the persons who run the risk on behalf of the public, 
suffer if the risk eventuates ? ’ 77 To return to Hale LJ ’ s example, why should an employee of 
a furniture remover (advancing no public utility but rather a private, commercial interest) 
be able to recover in circumstances where Mr King cannot ? Buxton LJ felt unable to go 
beyond the speculative in  King. Indeed it is clear that he felt constrained by the line of 
authority he perceived to stem from  Watt to fi nd against the claimant. 78 This element of 
doubt on the part of Buxton LJ (as to whether the outcome in  King was the fair outcome) 
underlines the degree to which he seems to have felt the weight of earlier authority. 
 Public benefi t, private burden ? 
 It is time to pull together a few threads from this review of some of the cases that bear on 
the issue of social utility in breach of duty decisions. In all of the types of cases identifi ed 
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it is easy to fi nd judges talking about social utility and its relevance to the breach of duty 
balancing exercise, but it is rather harder to fi nd cases where social utility has made a 
material difference to the outcome. Many of the cases seem, in fact, to turn on the very 
low level of foreseeable risk of serious injury, or on the fact that the claimant is solely 
responsible for the accident (which, as these cases are decided, tends to amount to the 
same thing, ie there is, in those instances, a very low level of foreseeable risk of serious 
harm because the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen the claimant behaving in 
the way he did). 
 As I have mentioned earlier, for Beever this leads to the conclusion that social utility 
is not, in fact, a relevant element in the consideration of breach of duty. 79 Is Beever ’ s 
position sustainable ? 
 Perhaps the fi rst thing to be said is this. In so far as Beever ’ s position requires a 
conclusion that judges who say they are doing one thing are, in reality (and, it would seem, 
without realising it) doing something else entirely, then this is problematic. As has been 
seen there is no shortage of judges who repeat the mantra that social utility is a relevant 
consideration in the breach of duty assessment. To say that social utility is irrelevant despite 
the fact that judges say the opposite and, indeed, say that it is an issue to which they may 
(or must) address their minds is, with respect to Beever, an overly robust conclusion. What 
is clear is that on the facts of individual cases some of the times when judges remark on 
the relevance of social utility it turns out to be a factor that is not decisive in that particular 
case (because the disposal of the case can be achieved without social utility playing a 
decisive part). That is a conclusion that can be drawn from such disparate cases as  Tomlinson 
and  Humphrey. In both of these cases the decision was based on a low level of foreseeable 
risk of serious injury such that the balancing exercise in which social utility may play a 
part was not, in the end, reached in any signifi cant way. Arguably, however, Beever treats 
foreseeability as too much of an on/off switch. It might, however, be said that there are 
three very broad levels of foreseeability of harm which are relevant to breach of duty 
decisions in negligence: 
 1.  At one extreme, cases in which the level of foreseeability of harm is so low that 
no reasonable defendant is obliged to take any steps to obviate that risk. Into this 
category (at least on the factual fi ndings of the courts) would seem to fall  Tomlinson 
and  Humphrey. Even though social utility is discussed in these cases it does not drive 
the outcome. In other words, even if the activity had not been socially useful liability 
would still not have attached because the level of foreseeable risk was too low. 
 2.  At the other extreme, cases where the foreseeability of serious injury is so high 
that the social utility of the activity can never be suffi cient to justify the risk. Into 
this category may come a case where, for example, an ambulance responding to an 
emergency call drives well over the speed limit, past school gates, at home time (to 
take a rather extreme example). The level of risk to which the driver is exposing the 
children, their parents and anyone else in the area is suffi ciently high that social utility 
is never likely to make any difference. 
 3.  In the middle there are cases where the level of foreseeable risk is not so small that 
the defendant is justifi ed in ignoring it. Rather, the level of risk is such that the 
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defendant must take reasonable steps to remove or reduce that risk but what steps are 
reasonable will depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the purposes 
on which the defendant is engaged. Such a situation would seem to be illustrated by 
 King and, in particular, by the hypothetical example approved by both Hale LJ and 
Buxton LJ when they drew a distinction between the facts of that accident (where 
no liability attached) and the possible facts of a substantially similar accident but 
involving commercial furniture removers (where liability would attach). 80 What is 
the material difference between those two cases which gives rise to liability in the 
one but not the other if not the nature of the activity on which the defendant is 
engaged, ie issues of social utility ? 
 The conclusion of all this can be summarised in a series of steps. 
 Firstly, the breach of duty analysis is about a balance between the degree of foreseeable 
risk and what the defendant should have done in response to that foreseeable risk. 
 Secondly, this balance requires a court to weigh a number of factors. The fi rst and, 
in many respects, prominent, factor is the degree of foreseeable risk. This, in turn, involves 
a consideration not merely of the likelihood of the harm occurring but, also, its severity 
should it occur. 81 
 Thirdly, if that level of foreseeable risk is such that the defendant will be justifi ed 
in doing nothing in response to that risk, social utility will be irrelevant because the 
defendant will have no obligation to act regardless of the nature of the activity in which 
it is involved. Beever offers an alternative scenario when discussing  Bolton v Stone, which 
imagines that the defendant, rather than playing cricket, had been throwing stones at 
rabbits and hit the unfortunate claimant. He concludes that liability would not still have 
attached. On the premise that the risk of injury was very small this is, of course, correct, but 
it is correct for the very reason that the foreseeable risk was so small. It does not support a 
conclusion that social utility is never relevant. 82 
 Fourthly, if the level of foreseeable risk is very high social utility will, again, be 
irrelevant. This is because a defendant cannot be justifi ed in exposing others to such a high 
level of risk, regardless of the nature of the activity in which it is engaged. 
 Fifthly, if the level of foreseeable risk lies between these two levels then a more 
forensic analysis is required as to what a defendant ought to do in response to that risk. If 
the defendant has done all that the court considers it could reasonably have done in the 
circumstances then there is no liability. If the defendant has failed to do all that it should 
have done then it will be found to be in breach of duty. 
 Sixthly, and crucially, in these situations what the defendant should have done in 
response to the level of foreseeable risk is not always the same for the same level of risk. It is 
calibrated by a consideration of the social utility of the defendant ’ s activity and by whether, 
and if so, to what extent, taking steps to remove the foreseeable risk would hamper the 
continuance of that activity (and, consequently, would represent a dis-benefi t to society, 
or a section of it). Recall, in  Uren the level of risk was suffi ciently high that the defendant 
was required to act. How it needed to act was infl uenced by the factor of social utility 
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but liability was imposed because the steps required to reduce the risk to an  ‘ acceptable ’ 
level would not have signifi cantly interfered with the carrying on of that activity. More 
extensive steps, which might have prevented the activity in its entirety, were not required, 
even though a residual risk of injury remained. These more extensive steps would have 
been required (even to the extent of preventing the activity) had there been no social 
utility engaged. 
 Seventhly, as a consequence of the foregoing, social utility may turn out to be a 
deciding factor relatively rarely, because many cases will stand or fall on the basis of the 
high or low level of foreseeable risk, leading to social utility being an insuffi cient factor to 
shift the outcome one way or another. The fact that social utility may often not be decisive 
helps explain the relatively few cases in which it seems to be crucial, but does not, I would 
argue, support Beever ’ s conclusion that it is, therefore, irrelevant. 83 
 This still leaves open an important question of whether the law is taking the correct 
approach to the assessment of breach of duty. Should it be the case that the social utility 
of the defendant ’ s conduct has any relevance at all in assessing breach of duty ? On this 
issue Mullender and Beever take opposite positions. Mullender answers the question about 
social utility largely in the affi rmative. 84 He concludes that it is important to ensure that the 
law of negligence does not operate in such a way as to prevent (or discourage) the carrying 
out of socially useful activities. The underlying premise here is that if such activities are 
discouraged then the result will be that we will all be the poorer as a consequence of such 
activities no longer taking place. We are presented with a vision of no village fetes, 85 no 
character-forming  ‘ rough and tumble ’ games for scouts, 86 and, potentially, no lifesaving 
rescues by the emergency services. 87 That appears to be the premise of, for example, the 
Compensation Act 2006 as indicated in debates on the Second Reading of the Bill. 88 
 There may, however, be several reasons to question Mullender ’ s conclusion that social 
utility ought to play a role in assessing breach of duty. 
 The fi rst relates to the additional layer of uncertainty that the inclusion of social 
utility brings to the assessment of breach of duty. Put simply, its inclusion involves judges in 
making value judgments about the kind of conduct that carries social utility, and assigning 
to it a level of utility that would make it a useful concept in the breach of duty balancing 
exercise. This, in turn, is likely to vary from judge to judge and, indeed, may also vary 
over time. Mullender, himself, seems to recognise this when he says  ‘ it prompts [judges] to 
make often very large assumptions about the social signifi cance or value of the activities 
in which individuals and institutions engage ’ . 89 These issues receive practical illustration 
in the  Uren litigation, where Smith LJ on the one hand, and Field J and Foskett J on the 
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other hand seem to come to quite different conclusions as to the level of social utility to 
be found in the game organised by the defendant. 90 It might be contended that all breach 
of duty decisions are, by their very nature, diffi cult to predict. But, when judges discuss 
social utility in a way which appears to be heavily value-laden, and do so where the social 
utility under discussion often does not seem to be determinative, predictability of outcome 
can be sacrifi ced even further. Where outcomes are highly uncertain it becomes much 
more diffi cult for parties to reach sensible settlements without recourse to litigation which 
is problematic, especially in the modern approach to dispute resolution in preference to 
litigation. 
 The second criticism of Mullender ’ s position relates to the whole premise (a premise 
that, in many ways, underlies the whole  ‘ compensation culture ’ debate) that liability will 
lead to desirable activities being curtailed. The diffi culty with this is that the argument is 
rarely accompanied by any empirical evidence of the claimed impact. Indeed, it seems clear 
that many of the activities being considered in these cases could very easily have carried on 
with relatively minor adjustments in order to bring the risk level down to an acceptable 
level. For example, in  Scout Association v Barnes a game played in darkness would have lost 
very little, if any, of its social utility if played with the lights on. 91 This would suggest that 
it is insuffi cient for judges merely to consider the social utility of the activity. If this factor 
is to have any impact at all it is important that judges also consider critically defendants ’ 
arguments about the consequences of fi nding a breach of duty to have occurred. 
 The third criticism of Mullender ’ s position arises out of one of his own justifi cations. 
The use of social utility is, for Mullender, an implicit use of the philosophy of  ‘ welfare 
consequentialism ’ . This is the idea that we can  ‘ sacrifi ce some members of society in pursuit 
of outcomes that benefi t the overwhelming majority of people ’ . 92 This is, in broad terms, 
a utilitarian approach. All societies engage in this kind of policy making to some degree. 
But, Mullender also claims that  ‘ welfare consequentialism is egalitarian in orientation ’ . 93 
This seems to be a major part of its legitimacy for him. This would imply that it treats all 
members of society on an equal basis. But this is, I would argue, incorrect. Rather than 
treating all members of society equally it singles out individual members of society (those 
who have the misfortune of suffering injury as a consequence of the activity in question) 
and requires them to bear the entirety of the loss on society ’ s behalf. This outcome is the 
very opposite of egalitarian. 
 So, as Beever himself has pointed out, there is something of a paradox at work 
here. 94 If the activity in question is of such social utility that it is (collectively) important 
to society that the activity should continue, it seems hard to see why it is that the claimant 
who has the misfortune to be injured in the pursuit of that socially useful activity should, 
effectively, bear the cost of that loss personally. If it is socially useful for ambulances to be 
able to transport patients to hospital even in circumstances where doing so gives rise to a 
clear risk of injury to the ambulance personnel why should the person injured in pursuit 
of that activity bear the loss, rather than that loss being, somehow, socialised ? Similarly, if 
there is social utility in the playing of cricket, why should the passer by hit by the cricket 
Public benefi t, private burden?
245
 95  King ,  supra n 61 at 47. 
 96  Some of that burden may, of course, be mitigated by the NHS and the social welfare system. This mitigation is, 
however, unlikely to be more than partial. The social welfare system does not, in general, replace lost income to 
any signifi cant degree, nor does it do anything to compensate for the more intangible aspects of injury. 
 97  While it may be rare, it is still possible. As argued above, the issue of social utility was important (and, perhaps, 
decisive) in  King , n 61, and, perhaps, in  Watt ,  supra n 13. These are both cases where it is diffi cult to explain the 
outcome on the basis of the low level of foreseeability of harm alone. 
ball struck out of the ground and injured, bear that loss personally ? Should society not bear 
the losses associated with the activities from which it derives benefi t ? The simplest way to 
achieve this within the existing liability system would be to impose liability on defendants 
in these kind of cases, who could then spread that loss through insurance (or, perhaps, in 
the case of public services, through taxation). 
 This was, as already touched upon, an issue on which Buxton LJ mused (inconclusively) 
in  King. As he put it,  ‘ … why should those men of courage, who are the persons who run 
the risk on behalf of the public, suffer if the risk eventuates ? ’ 95 Clearly in the context of an 
individual case coming before the Court of Appeal this was not a question Buxton LJ felt 
himself able to run with much further. 
 But his concerns are valid, not merely in connection with the emergency services but 
with the social utility cases in general. In all types of social utility case it is the individual 
injured claimant who fi nds himself bearing the loss for the benefi t of society. This would 
seem to be distributively unfair, in the sense of failing to properly balance the distribution 
of benefi ts and burdens across society, as well as correctively unfair in the sense that the 
defendant is permitted to impose unnecessary risk which eventuates in injury. It would 
not be unduly diffi cult for the Supreme Court, should an appropriate case come before 
it, to recognise this unfairness and remove social utility from the breach of duty balancing 
exercise. While this would have the most obvious attraction in the emergency services 
cases it is unlikely that it would be feasible to limit such a reform to one type of case 
only. Rather, such a reform would need to apply across the board. For the reasons already 
seen in the analysis of the cases above, this would be unlikely to change the outcome of 
all that many cases. Most outcomes would remain the same because of the relatively low 
level of signifi cance social utility plays in many claims. But where there are cases where 
the claimant might have succeeded but fails to do so because of the (perceived) need to 
preserve the defendant ’ s ability to continue the activity, such claimants, I would submit, 
should succeed so that the cost of the socially useful activity lies where it should, on 
society. Those who take the benefi ts should also bear the burden. It is, I would submit, 
inherently unfair to ask one individual who has the misfortune of being injured to bear 
the whole of the burden of that injury as a proxy (one might even say a sacrifi cial lamb) 
for the rest of us. 96 
 Conclusion 
 We have seen that there are many different types of social utility discussed by judges, and 
it is convenient to categorise those cases in order to fi nd a structure for analysis. Contrary 
to the view of Beever, I would argue that the balance of authority seems to be that social 
utility is a relevant factor in the breach of duty balancing exercise but, equally, it seems that 
it may be a decisive factor only relatively rarely. 97 This is because many cases stand and fall 
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on the basis of the level of foreseeable risk. Nonetheless, situations do appear where social 
utility is, at the very least, in the mix in relation to liability decisions. So long as judges see 
it as a relevant factor, and talk of it in those terms, we cannot safely assume it will not be 
decisive in future cases. 
 This gives rise to a paradoxical situation whereby the cost of the socially benefi cial 
activity can end up falling on one unfortunate individual, rather than that cost being 
spread across society as a whole. In circumstances where that does occur it is submitted 
that that is an unfair outcome. 
